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DESTRUCTION OF CONTINGENT INTERESTS BY
TERMINATION OF A TRUST
Future interests is one of the most vexacious and troublesome areas
of the law. It is steeped in the historical development of English society
and law. The bases of the conglomeration of laws making up this field
often appear to have no relationship to or function in the modern world.
One such rule deals with the destruction of a property right-the
future interest. Out of the constant battle between feudal kings and
their independent landholders for the control of land came a series of
moves and counter-moves by each side which attempted to restrict and
free the rights of landowners to dispose of their property. From this
struggle emerged the fee simple transfer of land and other devices such
as life estates, estates for years, fee tails and so on. At this point the
remainder came into being. After the ability to alienate land was
achieved, the next step in total alienability of land was the power to
dispose of it so that the right to possession was delayed until a time in
the future. This interest in land, termed a future interest, included the
remainder, the reversion, the possibility of reverter, and the right of
re-entry. 1
This article is concerned with the contingent remainder and the
related executory interest. The main purpose is to survey the rules of
law dealing with the destructibility of these particular interests when
they are created by a trust. In particular, the discussion is concerned
with the question of whether a trust can be terminated before the time
set for termination by the settlor, thereby destroying a future interest
which was created in the trust.
A remainder has been defined as an interest which takes effect
only upon the termination of the estate which supports it. It cannot
by supported by an estate which is subject to divestment. 2 There are
two types of remainders, vested and contingent. A vested remainder is
an interest which is created to take effect upon the termination of the
supporting estate, and is not subject to any conditions upon which it will
take effect, other than the termination of the prior estate. A contingent
'C. M oYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY at 93. The creation
of a remainder is by words of purchase as opposed to words of limitation which pass
property by descent, and would create a fee simple in the holder of the life estate
upon which the attempted remainder depended.
2L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS at 10 (1951). An interest
following an estate of that nature is called an executory interest.
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remainder is one which will take effect if some expressed condition is
met prior to the termination of the supporting estate.3
Under the feudal theory of seisin, conveyance of land was consum-
mated by passing possession of the land from the grantor to the grantee
in a formalized manner. From this formality developed the rule that
there could be no conveyance of land to take effect in the future, if it
was created by the same instrument which created a present interest.
A vested remainder met the test of this rule, because it followed a
present estate and created a present right of future possession. A con-
tingent remainder, however, did not become an interest as of right until
the condition to its vesting was met. It could be destroyed if it did not
vest before the termination of the prior supporting estate, since the
land could not be held without an owner pending the vesting of the re-
mainder.4 From these rules grew the common law rule of destructibility:
a contingent remainder which did not vest at or before the termination
of the preceding estate was destroyed. Destruction could occur by na-
tural expiration of the estate, forfeiture of the estate, or merger of the
estate with a successive estate.5
Prior to the Statute of Uses,8 the remainder was the only future
interest recognized without resort to an interest called the use, the fore-
runner of the modern trust. However, when the Statute of Uses turned
equitable interests into corresponding legal interests, other future inter-
ests called executory interests came into being. An executory interest
was not vested and did not take effect until the divestment of a prior
1id. at 19-21. The difference between a contingent remainder and a vested remainder
subject to divestment is in the type of condition which affects the interest. The
former only takes effect on the occurrence of a condition precedent. The latter takes
effect immediately, but can be destroyed by the occurrence of a condition subsequent.
Vested remainders are classified as indefeasible, subject to complete divestment or
subject to open. Subject to complete divestment means that the remainder is limited
so that it may be destroyed by an event or an action occurring after it has vested.
Subject to open refers to class remainders which are redivided when another member
enters the class.
4Seisin could not be held suspended pending the outcome of the condition precedent
requirement. Thus the remainder was considered void and the estate which depended
upon the condition precedent was held to vest in the grantor as a reversion. Further,
if the condition were met later, it did not cause the conditional estate to vest, because
seisin was in the grantor and it took a new conveyance to place it in the owner of
the contingent remainder.
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1 at 128-133.
51d.
"It was vital to the landed class in England, which measured wealth by land, that
they be assured that their property passed to their lineal descendents. The destructi-
bility of contingent remainders prompted the gentry to develop the use. By this
method the legal estate could be granted to a person trusted by the grantor for the
use of others. The land was held in seisin by the trustee and contingent remainders
could be protected against the termination of the prior estate upon which the con-
tingent remainder depended. Eventually, because of abuses of this method of con-
veyancing, the State of Uses was passed. It was aimed at protecting the interest of
the crown, but more importantly it did not prohibit the use, but rather attempted to
control it. Uses were recognized and contingent remainders continued to be protected
in the use or active trust. Id, at 181-183.
2
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estate. Generally, an executory interest divested the prior estate upon
the occurrence of the condition upon which that estate depended. How-
ever, the executory interest could also be designed to take effect after
the termination of the prior estate, although there was a time lapse,
between the two estates.7
Executory interests were not affected by the destructibility rule.
Equitable remainders were also protected from destruction. In the de-
sire to allow the grantor to dispose of land as he wished, courts began
to construe remainders as vested, if at all possible, in order to prevent
them from being destroyed.8 By means of the use, contingent interests
and executory interests were protected from destruction. By this method
a life estate could be created with the remainder to Y in trust for the
children of X for the life of X to preserve the contingent remainders,
remainder to such of X's children as survive him. By this device, Y
takes a vested remainder of the legal title with the equitable remainder
of the title in the children who will take the legal title if they are living
at the death of their father. The modern trust has the same effect in
that the trustee is conveyed the legal title, while the beneficiary is con-
veyed the equitable title. The separation of the legal and equitable
estate serves to protect the equitable interests in the contingent re-
maindermen.0
There is little case law in Montana dealing with the termination of
trusts. Bradbury v. Nagelhus'0 dealt with the problem of termination in
relation to a constructive trust. The Court stated that "[T]rusts are ex-
tinguished only by illegality, impossibility or fulfillment.""
In the Matter of the Testamentary Trust of Child 2 is the only Mon-
tana decision which deals with the problem of termination of a testa-
mentary trust prior to the time set for termination by the testator-settlor.' '
'HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 0F FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 2 at 25-27. In the former
case it is hard to distinguish an executory interest from a contingent remainder. The
prime distinction is that the remainder follows the prior estate upon its termination,
while the executory interest follows the divestment of the prior estate.
Ald. at 189 and n. 3.
Id. at 38-46. In 1877 the destructibility of legal contingent remainders was made
impossible in England by statute. The destructibility is limited in varying degrees
in the United States with or without statutes.
'
0Bradbury v. Nagelhus 132 Mont. 417, 319 P.2d 503. (1957).
DId. 319 P.2d at 510. There was no elaboration of this statement and it does not bear
directly on the point in question. The case involved a constructive trust which has
no time set for completion of the purpose of the trust.
"In Be Child 26 St. Rep. 454. (1969).
"Montana does not recognize the executory interest. Revised Codes of Montana (R.C.M.)
§ 67-319 (1947), states that future interests are either vested or contingent. A future
interest is vested when there is a person in being who would have a right, defeasible
or indefeasible, to the immediate possession of the property upon the ceasing of the
intermediate or precedent interest. R.C.M. § 7-320 (1947). A future interest is con-
tingent whilst the person in whom, or the event upon which, it is limited to take effect
remains uncertain. R.C.M. § 67-321 (1947). The definition of a vested interest ap-
pears to include certain contingent interests, such as estate in a living person which
depends upon the occurrence of a condition precedent.
1969]
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This case arose from the desire of several beneficiaries to terminate the
trust. Some of these objecting beneficiaries had vested remainders sub-
ject to divestment, and their children had shifting executory interests
which would take effect on the divestment of the estates of their parents.
The trust was created by Harry W. Child in his will which was
probated in 1931. The balance of his property was to be distributed
through the trust. His wife, son-in-law, and a personal friend were
appointed trustees and were given the residue of the estate. The trust
was to exist during the life of the testator's mother, sister, son, Huntley
Child Sr., and until the youngest survivor among the children of Hunt-
ley Child Sr., and until the youngest survivor among the children of
Huntley Child Sr. reached age 40 or died. In this manner the testator
described specifically the period for which he intended the trust to last,
and in accordance with Montana law designated the events which would
defeat the future interests created in the trust.14
In paragraph 12 of his will, Child set forth the manner in which
the income of the trust was to be distributed. He created a life income
for his mother and his sister. He created a monthly income for his son,
Huntley Child Sr., to last until he reached 50 years of age or died. The
trustees were also to pay a monthly income to the three children of
Huntley Child Sr. as long as the testator's wife was alive. The balance
of the income was to go to the wife of the testator for life. At her death,
the income of the trust, which remained after the specific amounts were
paid was to be distributed between Huntley Child Sr. and his three
children, Huntley Child Jr., Marion Child, and Elizabeth Child, and the
testator's daughter, Ellen Dean Child Nichols, and her heirs. 5 If any
of the children of Huntley Child Sr. were not living at the death of the
testator's wife, then their issue took the share of the parent per stirpes.
These bequests were specified to last as long as the trust was in exist-
ence.
16
14R.C.M. § 67-418 (1947). A future interest may be defeated in any manner or by any
act or means which the party creating such interest provided for or authorized in the
creation thereof; nor is the future interest, thus liable to be defeated, to be on that
ground adjudged void in its creation.
'
TThe specific distribution of the income of the testator's wife on her death was 1/16
to Huntley Child Sr., 1/16 each to Huntley Child Sr. 's three children, Huntley Child
Jr., Marion Child and Elizabeth Child, and "% to Ellen Dean Child Nichols, the testa-
tor 's daughter. In Be Child, supra note 12 at 456.
"Id. All of the income interests were included in section (a) through (e) of paragraph
12, section 1. Section 2 of that paragraph described the manner of the distribution
of the corpus of the estate upon the occurrence of all the events which measured the
life of the trust. One-fourth of the trust was given to the children of Huntley Child
Sr. or their issue per stirpes. The other three-fourths was given to the daughter of
the testator, Ellen Nichols and to her heirs.
[Vol. 31
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At the time the suit was brought, all of Huntley Sr.'s children had
reached age 40, and the testator's mother, sister, and daughter were dead.
Huntley Child Sr. was still living. Thus all but one of the events which
would terminate the trust had occurred. Huntley Sr. had been divested
of his interest in the income from the portion originally given to the
testator's wife. 17 Huntley Jr. had been divorced and as part of the di-
vorce settlement had given his ex-wife one-half of his interest in the
corpus of the trust. The divorce decree specifically reserved his interest
in the income to him and stated that he gave his ex-wife one-half inter-
est in his interest in the corpus, subject to loss if he died before the
trust was terminated.' 8
The trial court found as a fact that the object of the trust was to
create a life income for the mother, sister, and son of the testator. The
Montana Supreme Court upheld this finding and added that the testa-
tor's purpose was fulfilled when the income payments could no longer
be made to one of those persons. 19 The court also upheld the finding that,
since the testator's purpose had been fulfilled, the trust was extin-
guished.
20
To determine whether a trust can be extinguished before the time
set for termination by the settlor, it is necessary to consider the condi-
tions under which the testator wanted the trust to end, the purposes of
the testator in creating the trust, and whether those purposes were in
fact completed. In the Child will it appears that the plain meaning of the
'-Creditors had been granted the income interest which was to last until Huntley Sr.
reached age 50. Creditors had also been granted the income which he was to receive
after his mother died. This interest had been recovered by his three children, who
shared it equally. In ie Child, supra note 12 at 457 and 541. In this respect see
R.C.M. § 86-112 (1947). The beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of the rents and
profits of real property, or for the payment of an annuity out of such rents and
profits cannot transfer or in any manner dispose of his interest in such trust. The
attachment of Huntley Sr.'s interest by his creditors seems to be void at least to any
real property in the corpus of the trust which would mean that he should have re-
tained some income interest in the trust. This would defeat the decision of the court
in the Child case. It is also possible that the statute could be construed to apply to
income interest in trusts of personal property as well.
1In Re Child, supra note 12 at 456 and 458. Huntley Jr.'s ex-wife received a one-half
undivided interest in the one-twelfth interest of Huntley Jr. in the corpus of the
estate. This interest of course was not guaranteed, since if Huntley Jr. predeceased
Huntley Sr. the interest would be taken by his children per stirpes.
"Id. at 462. As authority for its interpretation of the trust, the court cited the fol-
lowing statutes: I.C.M. § 91-201 (1947). A will is to be construed according to the
intention of the testator. Where his intention cannot have effect to its full extent,
it must have effect as far as possible. R.C.M. § 91-202 (1947). In cases of uncertainty
arising upon the face of a will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into view
the circumstances under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations. R.C.M.
§ 9-205 (1947). All the parts of a will are to be construed in relation to each other,
so as, if possible, to form one consistent whole; but where several parts are absolutely
irreconcilable, the latter must prevail.
'As authority for terminating the trust on the basis of the objects being completed
the court cited R.C.M. § 86-601 (1947). A trust is extinguished by the entire fulfill-
ment of its object or by such object becoming impossible or unlawful.
1969]
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words used to describe the time for termination of the trust was that it
should end on the occurrence of all the conditions stated. If the testator
had desired that the trust terminate on those conditions or the forfeiture
of the right to receive income by the beneficiaries whose lives measured the
trust, then he should have specifically provided for that condition.
It also appears from the will that the testator's purpose went beyond
the creation of a life income for his wife, mother, sister and son. In the
same section in which he created a life income for his son, the testator
also created an income in the children of Huntley Sr. or their issue, if
any were deceased, which was to last for the period of the trust. It
appears clear that all of the purposes of the trust had not been completed,
but could still be completed. Thus the Montana statute which authorizes
termination of a trust when the objects are completed, impossible or
illegal does not apply to this case.
21
In view of R.C.M. 1947 § 91_201,22 even though the life income could
not be paid to Huntley Sr., the intent of the testator should have been car-
ried out as far as possible. In other words, the testator's intent to pay in-
come to the children of the children of Huntley Sr. should have been given
effect, though the life income provisions for Huntley Sr. could not be
given full effect. It is apparent that the decision of the Montana Su-
preme Court hinges on the interpretation of the purposes of the trust.
The crucial issue in the Child case is apparent. If the purpose of
the trust was to preserve the corpus for the full period of time set by
the testator so as to allow the future interest created therein the oppor-
tunity of taking effect, then the court should not have terminated the
trust. The testator had created unvested future interests 23 in the issue
of the children of Huntley Jr., Marion, and Elizabeth.2 4 These were
equitable interests which according to the common law are indestruct-
ible. 25 Therefore, unless the Supreme Court was correct in its construe-
2Id.
-R.C.M. § 91-201 (1947), supra note 19.
2Historically, contingent remainders and executory interests were distinguished. By
R.C.M. § 67-319 (1947) there remain only two types of future interests, vested and
contingent. To avoid confusion and yet preserve the separation of the types of future
interests, the term unvested future interest has been used throughout this article to
refer to both contingent remainders and executory interests.
24The interests created in the children of Huntley Child Sr. and their issue can be
viewed either as vested remainders in the children of Huntley Sr. and shifting executory
interests in their issue, or as alternative contingent remainders. For purposes of this
discussion, however, the distinction poses no problem, since both are protected as equit-
able interests. See Festing v. Allen, 67 Rev. Rep. 339 (Ex. 1843), and Edwards v.
Hammond, 3 Lev. 132 (Common Pleas 1683).
'Even if the equitable unvested future interests were not protected under the common
law theory, these interests seem to be protected under Montana law. R.C.M. § 67-419
(1947). No future interest can be defeated or barred by any alienation or other act
of the owner of the intermediate or precedent interest, nor by any destruction of such
precedent interest by forfeiture, surrender, merger or otherwise, except as provided
by the next section, or where a forfeiture is impressed by statute as a penalty for the
violation thereof.
[Vol. 31
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tion of the trust that the sole object was the creation of a life interest
for the wife, mother, sister, and son, it was incorrect to terminate the
trust before the end of the measuring life because unvested future inter-
ests were thereby destroyed.
Many state jurisdictions have dealt with the problem of the termina-
tion of a trust before the time set by the testator. From these decisions
general rules have developed. It appears that in order for the court to
terminate a trust, the purposes must practically be completed, and all
persons with an interest in the trust must consent to its termination.26
In addition, a number of jurisdictions require that all persons with an
interest in the trust must be present in their own behalf, or that all
interests have vested before the court can terminate the trust prior to
the time set by the testatorY
The effect of the requirement of all persons with interests being
represented in their own behalf is that a future interest existing in a
trust prevents termination without acquiescence by the holder of that
interest. Several jurisdictions have not stated the rule in this fashion,
but merely have relied on the existence of an unvested future interest
as sufficient reason to prevent termination of the trust prior to the time
set for termination of the trust by the settlor.2  Relying on the intent
of the testator, these cases either state or imply that creation of an un-
vested future interest in a trust is expressive of an intent of the settlor
to protect the corpus of the trust until the time set for termination in
order to allow these interests a full opportunity to take effect.29
If these rules are applied to the Child case, it appears that the Su-
preme Court did not give sufficient weight to the intent of the testator
in creating the trust, and that they should have refused to terminate it
because the purposes of the trust were not all completed or impossible
of completion. A good example of the solution to the issue presented in
hIn Be Gallimore's Estate, 99 Cal. App. 2d 664, 222 P.2d 257 (1950); Byers v. Beddow,
106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932); Hill v. Traveler's Bank and Trust Co., 125 Conn.
640, 7 A.2d 652, 123 A.L.R. 1419 (1939).
2'Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 Ill. 76, 159 N.E. 228 (1937); Miller's Executors v.
Miller's Heirs and Creditors, 172 Ky. 519, 189 S.W. 417 (1916); Brandenburg v.
Thorndike, 139 Mass. 192, 28 N.E. 575 (1885); Gwin v. Hutton, 100 Miss. 320, 56
So. 446 (1911).
2In Re MeKenney's Will, 169 Md. 640, 182 A. 425 (1936); Kimball v. Blanchard, 101
Me. 383, 64 A. 645 (1906); In Re Kamerly's Estate, 384 Pa. 225, 35 A.2d 258 (1944);
Bettis v. Harrison, 186 S.C. 352, 195 S.E. 385 (1938).
211n Re Adoption of a Minor, 214 F.2d 844 (1954); Ramage v. First Farmers' and
Merchants' Bank of Troy, 249 Ala. 240, 30 So.2d 706 (1947); In Re Washburn's
Estate, 11 Cal. App. 735, 106 P. 415 (1910); Byers v. Beddow, supra note 26;
Mohler v. Wesner, 382 Ill. 225, 47 N.E.2d 64 (1943); Brandenburg v. Thorndike,
supra note 27; Hill v. Hill, 49 Okla. 646, 152 P. 1122 (1915); In Re Stack's Will, 217
Wis. 94, 258 N.W. 324, 97 A.L.R. 316 (1935).
The authors of treatises also are in agreement with the rules regarding the termination
of a trust prior to the time set by the settlor. See J. PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 920 at 1561-1568 (7th ed. 1929), and G. BOGERT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS at 591-593 & n. 49 (3rd ed. 1952).
1969]
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the Child case is the case of Ramage v. First Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank of Troy,30 in which the court found that termination of a testa-
mentary trust would be contrary to the testator's intent. That intent
was found from the creation of an unvested future interest which pre-
served the corpus for the benefit of a group whose members were sub-
ject to change, and who could not be ascertained until the time set for term-
ination of the trust by the testator. The court expressed its opinion
regarding termination, saying:
. . . Certainly in this case the court must decline to terminate the
trust where termination will not only defeat the object of the testator,
but where in doing so the contingent interest will be cut off.'
California, whose statutes in regard to the termination of trusts
are similar to Montana's,3 2 has dealt frequently with the question pre-
sented in the Child case. A review of the California cases on the ques-
tion in point supports the conclusion that the Montana Supreme Court
should have refused to terminate the Child trust.
In the case of In Re Washburn's Estate,33 the testator created a trust
which gave a life income to his daughter and wife. On the death of
either, the income of the deceased went to the other beneficiary for her
life. On the death of the surviving beneficiary, the corpus was to be
paid to the two living children of the daughter, and to any children
born to her thereafter, or to their issue per stirpes. The daughter acting
as guardian for her children relinquished her right to income in their
favor. She argued that the sole purpose of the trust had been to collect
and pay her the income after the other life beneficiary died; that when
she gave up this right to income, the estate became merged with the
remainders of her children; and that, since she had no further interest
in the trust, the purposes were complete. However, the court found that
the interests of her children were contingent 34 since it was not known if
more would be born.
The court decided, therefore, that there could be no merger of a life
estate and a contingent interest so as to create a fee simple. In other
words, the legal title to the corpus stayed in the trustees until the occur-
rence of the contingency upon which the termination depended, which
in this case, was the death of the life income beneficiary. On this basis,
the court refused to terminate the trust. Therefore, the California Court
finds that the creation of a future interest, which is to vest only upon
"Ramage v. First Farmers and Merchants' Bank of Troy, supra note 29.
"1Id. 30 So.2d at 714.
"West, Annotated California Civil Code, §§ 694, 695, 740, 742 and 2279 (West 1954),
and West, California Probate Code §§ 102, 103 and 105 (West 1957).
"In Be Washburn's Estate, supra note 29
"The court described future interests as vested or contingent which agrees with their
law on the subject and shows the abrogation of the distinction between contingent
remainders and executory interests.
[Vol. 31
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the occurrence of a particular contingency, demonstrates the expression
of an intent of the testator to delay the distribution of the corpus until
that specified time, and that this intent must be honored.
35
The case of In Re Gallimore's Estate3' dealt with the problem of
termination of a trust where the purposes were alleged to have been
completed. The court found some authority for the proposition that a
trust could be terminated over the objections of a beneficiary if the
purposes of the trust were accomplished, but then added: "That rule
will never be applied, however, where the rights of a beneficiary will be
adversely affected by the termination. ' 37 The court then discussed the
intent of the testator and purposes of the trust by stating:
The argument of appellants is that this case is one where no purpose
can be served by the continuing of the trust. But this contention dis-
regards Clause "(c)" of the trust. This is not a case where the in-
terests of the beneficial life interests have merged with the vested
interests. Robert Gallimore Jr. has a contingent survivorship interest
in the income of the trust under Clause "(c)". This being so, the
trial court properly refused to terminate the trust over his objec-
tion.3 8
These statements appear to be an equation of the creation of an
unvested future interest with the purposes of the trust. Therefore, in
California, the purposes of a trust are not impossible of completion if
the corpus or income can be distributed to a remainderman, or if a
divesting interest is created which will vest upon the termination of the
prior estate. This case is directly in point with the Child case since the
issue of Huntley Child Sr.'s children have a similar interest which will
vest on the termination of the estate of their parents, or take efect with
respect to the corpus if their parents die before the termination of the
trust.
39
Creation of an unvested future interest can be construed to be the
expression of an intent not to have the trust terminated until the occur-
rence of the event, or expiration of the time upon which termination is to
occur. In other words, the purpose of the trust is to protect the corpus
"In Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust and Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 P. 425 (1920),
the court decided that there was a conclusive presumption that a woman could have
a child as long as she was alive, regardless of other circumstances. This presumption
was applied to trusts to prevent their termination where the possibility of issue existed
and those issue would have an unvested future interest. The important point with
reference to the issue in Child is that termination was not allowed where unvested
future interests could exist in unascertained persons.
$'In Re Gallimore's Estate, supra note 26.
"Id. 222 P.2d at 261.
Id. Clause I (c)'" of the trust created an unvested future. interest in each remainder-
man by providing that on the death of another remainderman before the termination
of the trust, the survivors would share his one-fourth interest.
8Supra, note 24.
1969]
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for the unvested future interests until the time set for termination of the
trust.
40
In Byers v. Beddow,4 1 the Florida Supreme Court met the issue of
the determination of the purposes of a trust in which unvested future
interests had been created, and equated the purposes of a trust to the
creation of those interests in this manner:
Whenever courts are called upon to dissolve or terminate a trust,
they will be careful not to defeat any object of the trustor apparent
from his declaration of the purpose of the trust: to this end, courts
must decline to act when there are, or may be, persons interested in
the trust who are not before the court.'"
Illinois has also been specific in its equation of the creation of an
unvested future interest with the purposes of the trust. In Mohler v.
Wesner4 3 the Illinois Court faced a factual situation similar to that in the
Child case.44 There were unvested future interests extant in the trust.
However, all of the income beneficiaries joined in the suit to terminate
the trust after the beneficiary whose life measured the length of the
trust waived his rights to the income.
The future interests which were created were dependent upon the
occurrence of certain specified events. Each of the children had a re-
mainder in the corpus which was subject to divestment by his death.
Each of the remaindermen had a shifting executory interest in each
other's estate, since each beneficiary was an heir at law of the other,
and would share the interest of a beneficiary-remainderman who died
before the end of the trust. The court found that the trust could not be
terminated because the purposes of the testator in creating the unvested
future interests had not yet been accomplished:
The contention that Edward Mohler's waiver of the right to receive
forty percent of the income from the trust estate is tantamount to
his death, and therefore equally as effective as his death to extinguish
the life of the trust is untenable .... The purposes of the trust have
not been substantially satisfied: there are contingent interests in the
trust fund and a present determination of the ultimate beneficiaries
would be sheer speculation. 5 (emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that in this case, as in the Child case, the
testator had created interests which could only be determined at the
death of the last measuring life of the trust. The fact that he no longer
4OThis view is supported by subsequent California cases such as Wognan v. Wells Fargo
Bank and Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App.2d 657 267 P.2d 423 (1954). In Hunt v.
Lawton, 76 Cal. App. 655, 245 P. 803 (1926), the California Court decided that the
resignation of the sole income beneficiary did not mean that the purpose of the trust
was ended as the plaintiff had argued.
41Byers v. Beddow, supra note 26.
2Id. 142 So. at 896.
"Mohler v. Wesner, supra note 29.
"Id. 47 N.E.2d at 65 and 66.
"Id. 47 N.E.2d at 67.
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had any interest in the income of the trust did not affect the use of his
life as a measuring device. The reason for this is clear. One of the
purposes of the trust was to preserve the corpus of the trust until the
time set for the termination by the testator so that the unvested future
interest had a full opportunity to take effect. Applying this reasoning
to the Child case, it is clear that the purposes of the trust were not
complete or impossible of completion.46
The Massachusetts Court also decided the question in this manner.
In Brandenburg v. Thorndike,47 a trust was created from which the
widow of the testator was to receive a life income. Three years after
her death the corpus was to be distributed to the testator's nieces and
nephew, who were still living or to the issue of any of the beneficiaries
who were deceased, per stirpes. The widow waived her rights under the
will and elected to take her statutory share of the estate. The beneficiar-
ies then sued for termination of the trust. The court, after examining
the facts of the case, stated that the court had the power to terminate a
trust when the purposes were accomplished, and the interests under it
had vested in those seeking termination. The waiver by the widow of
her rights only affected that provision of the will in which she had a
personal interest. It could reduce the corpus of the trust, but did not
revoke or affect the bequests to the other beneficiaries under the trust.
The court stated:
We must construe the bequest in favor of the nieces and nephews
in the same manner as if the widow had accepted the provision of
the will.'8
Once again, the intent of the testator and his purpose in creating
unvested future interests is respected. If the testator had desired that
the trust be terminated before the date which he had prescribed, he
could have created indefeasible remainders to the nieces and nephew,
the remaindermen, instead of making them subject to divestment and
creating shifting executory interests for their issue. Therefore, the
testator must have had a purpose in the creation of those interests, and
it must be given effect.
The decision of the widow to take her statutory share, in renuncia-
tion of the will and trust income, can be equated with the divestment of
the life income of Huntley Sr. in the Child case. There appears to be no
sound reason for treating the loss of income by Huntley Sr. differently
from the widow's renunciation. Since the testator in both cases created
unvested future interests, his purpose in doing so should be respected and
the trust allowed to continue for the full term specified. 49
"See Gutman v. Schiller, 37 Ill. App.2d 58, 187 N.E.2d 315 (1963).
'"Brandenburg v. Thorndike, supra note 27.
"Id. 28 N.E. at 576.
'See Hoffman v. New England Trust Co., 187 Mass. 205, 72 N.E. 952 (1905).
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In Smith v. National Saving and Trust Co.,50 the court reached what
appears to be an opposite result in dealing with this problem. An inter
vivos trust was created to give the settlor a life income. At the settlor's
death the corpus was to be divided between her children or their issue
per stirpes. The specifically stated purpose of the trust was to prevent
her husband from dissipating her estate. She subsequently divorced her
husband, and sought to terminate the trust. The court found that the
purpose of the trust was completed, and no further purpose could be
served by continuing the trust.
The result appears to be in conflict with the established rules con-
cerning termination since the children had a vested remainder subject
to divestment, and their issue had a shifting executory interest in the
remainder. However, when the purpose of the trust is considered this
apparent conflict can be resolved. The creation of interests of sufficient
duration was required to assure that the estate could be controlled by
the descendents of the settlor after her death so as to prevent it from
falling into the hands of the husband. Therefore, the contingencies of
the death of the settlor's children had to be accounted for to assure that
protection. The terms of the trust disclose that this was the sole purpose
of the trust, and that it was accomplished by the divorce. Consequently
an exception to the rule of termination of a trust when unvested future
interests have been created exists in this jurisdiction. This exception is
limited to situations where the express purpose of the trust requires
future interests, vested and unvested, to complete that purpose. 51
Wisconsin's Supreme Court also equated the purpose of the trust
with the creation of an unvested future interest in the case of In Re
Stack's Will :52
We find no authority for the position that, where a trust becomes
impossible of completion for any reason suggested or a situation
arises not in the contemplation of the settlor which threatens the
loss of the trust res, the court will terminate the trust in the sense
that it will defeat he rights of the remaindermen for the benefit
of the life tenants where the parties are not sui juris and not before
the court .... While no doubt the court has the power, in case it is
found upon further investigation that a continuation of the present
situation threatens the total loss of the trust res, to order a sale
and cut off the interest of contingent remaindermen in the real estate,
which constitutes the corpus of the trust, and to cause the proceeds
to be impressed with the trust and reinvested, it is under a duty not
to destroy the trust.'
WSmith v. National Savings and Trust Co., 245 Fed. Supp. 532 (1965).
"This is supported by the fact that previous Washington D.C. cases, In Re Adoption
of a Minor, supra note 29. Hart v. Giner, 40 F.2d 794 (1930), held that a trust could
not be terminated prior to the time specified by the testator when an unvested future
interest would be thereby destroyed.
"In Re Stack's Will, supra note 29.
'Id. 258 N.W. at 326 and 328.
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The cases which have terminated trusts before the time set for
termination because the purposes were impossible of completion gener-
ally involved situations in which the trust corpus was destroyed or
seriously impaired.5 4 Also, the rule has been applied where the purpose
of the testator was specifically stated, and the creation of unvested
future interests were obviously an attempt to further that purpose. 55
Several of the cases examined dealt with attempts to terminate a trust
on the alleged grounds that the purposes were complete or impossible
of completion because the life beneficiary disclaimed his right to the
trust income. The courts have not allowed this type of termination un-
less all the parties agreed to the termination, and termination would
not defeat the testator's intent or purpose 56
Relating these rules to the Child case, all of the purposes of the
trust had not been accomplished nor were they impossible of accom-
plishment. First, the testator did not specifically state the purpose for
the creation of the trust, except that the bequest to his mother was for
her care and support. The other bequests were life incomes with the
exception of the original bequests to Huntley Sr. and his children, which
were replaced by life incomes after the testator's wife died. Second, the
terms of the trust were written in such a manner that the testator in-
cluded all the income interests in one section of paragraph twelve. He
did not create the life beneficiary interests, and as an afterthought, add
the income interests of the children of his son, Huntley Sr. If the desire
of the testator had not been to distribute the corpus of the estate upon
the occurrence of certain events, he could have avoided that possibility
by not creating future interests in the issue of Huntley Sr.. The testa-
tor could have accomplished the same result by making the remainder
absolute in the children of Huntley Sr., and allowing the interest to
pass to the heirs of those remaindermen by descent rather than through
the trust if the remaindermen died. Because the testator decided to
create the trust with unvested future interests he must have had a
reason, and his intent should be given effect to the fullest extent possible
in accordance with Montana law.57
"Fish v. National Bank of Phoenix, 64 Ariz. 164, 167 P.2d 107 (1946); Hughes v.
Neely, 332 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1960) ; Cuthbert v. Cuthbert, 136 N.Y. 326, 32 N.E. 1088
(1893); Townsend v. Schalkenbach Home for Boys, Inc., 33 Wash.2d 255, 205 P.2d
345 (1949); In Re Stack's Will, supra note 29. See also 92 A.L.R. 158, and 97 A.L.R.
325. In Stack, Townsend and Hughes, there were unvested future interests. The courts
found that the corpus could be sold and the trust terminated as to that particular
property. However, the proceeds from the sale were impressed with the trust and had
to be held for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the original trust.
'Smith v. National Savings and Trust Co., supra note 50.
"Brandenburg v. Thorndike, supra note 27 and Mohler v. Wesner, supra note 29.
VR.C.M. § 91-201 (1947) supra note 19.
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CONCLUSION
The cases studied which have dealt with the question of termination
of a trust containing unvested future interests reveal that only in un-
usual circumstances will the court allow the termination of a trust
before the times designated for termination by the settlor. Early term-
ination has been allowed where the trust res is destroyed or where all
purposes are completed. It must be shown in the latter case that the
creation of an unvested future interest was designed to support an
express purpose and was not a purpose in itself.5 Generally, however,
courts have either stated or implied that the creation of an unvested
future interest is evidence of a purpose to continue the trust for the full
term prescribed in order to give the interest the full opportunity to take
effect. 59
The desired rule is that the creation by the settlor of an unvested
future interest in the trust gives rise to a presumption that one of the
purposes of the trust is to preserve the corpus for the full term pre-
scribed by the settlor in order that the unvested future interest can
have the full opportunity to take effect. Those persons who seek an
early termination of the trust have the burden of proof to show that
this was not a purpose of the trust, and that the testator did not intend
to preserve the trust corpus for the full term prescribed for the trust.
On the basis of the cases examined, the Montana Supreme Court in
the Child case has ignored the general rule concerning the termination
of a trust before the time prescribed by the settlor. They brought the
case under the realm of a statute, R.C.M. 1947 § 86-601,60 and Restatement
§ 340,61 which apply only in very specific circumstances. These cir-
cumstances, that the purposes of the trust be accomplished or impos-
sible of accomplishment, do not exist in the facts of the Child case. On
the basis of the Montana law and the general rule of law regarding
early termination of a trust, a more appropriate result would have been
the continuation of the trust until the death of Huntley Child Sr., the
last measuring life of the trust.
ROBERT P. GOFF
5 Smith v. National Savings and Trust Co., supra note 50; In Re Frank's Will, 57
Misc. 2d 446, 293 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1968); Holden v. Morgan, 115 N.J.Eq. 59, 169 A.
546 (1933).
5 Supra note 29.
'Supra note 20.
6'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 335, 337 and 340 (1959). The Restatement
does not speak of the problem under consideration. Its illustrations of termination of
trusts because of completion or impossibility of completion of purposes do not include
examples in which unvested future interests exist. The discussion of impossibility of
completion of the purposes of the trust centers around trusts in which the trust corpus
has been destroyed or greatly injured. This indicates that the question of unvested
future interests has not been considered in those sections.
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